




















Department of Economics 
SCAPE Working Paper Series 
Paper No. 2007/01 - November 2006 
http://nt2.fas.nus.edu.sg/ecs/pub/wp-scape/0701.pdf 
 
SUSTAINABILITY OF FISCAL DEFICITS: 




Ananda Jayawickrama and Tilak Abeysinghe
 
  
SUSTAINABILITY OF FISCAL DEFICITS:  
THE U.S. EXPERIENCE 1929-2004 
 
Ananda Jayawickrama and Tilak Abeysinghe
*
Department of Economics 





Recurrent large fiscal deficits and accumulating public debt frequently ring alarm 
bells around the world on the sustainability of U.S. federal fiscal policy. The present-
value borrowing constraint, which states that, for the fiscal policy to be sustainable the 
current debt stock should match the discounted sum of expected future primary surpluses, 
provides a framework for analysing fiscal sustainability. Incorporating rational 
expectations we extend the methodology developed by Hamilton and Flavin (1986) to 
test the sustainability hypothesis in a cointegrating framework that can accommodate 
both stationary and non-stationary variables. Our model predicts dynamically diverse 
episodes of the debt series extremely well. Our results support the hypothesis that the U.S. 
government is solvent despite the large increase in the debt stock in recent years. 
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 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The escalating fiscal deficit of the U.S. federal government has brought to surface 
the old fears of its sustainability. Any perceived unsustainability of the fiscal deficit 
combined with the current account deficit, which has reached staggering heights in recent 
years, may severely affect the reserve currency status of the U.S. dollar and may bring 
about a destabilizing effect on the world economy. Given this scenario it is worth 
examining how the past experience of fiscal operations shed light on the sustainability 
issue. 
Fiscal deficit is nothing new to the U.S. Although the dynamics of each deficit- 
episode may differ, perhaps substantially, the government eventually has to face a 
borrowing constraint. If the Ponzi scheme
1 is ruled out, intertemporal budget operations 
of the government imply that the current debt stock must be matched by the present-value 
of expected primary surpluses (surplus net of interest payments). This condition, known 
as the present-value borrowing (PVB) constraint, holds when the fiscal policy is expected 
to generate sufficient net revenues in the future to repay the accumulated debt and interest 
payments. In a seminal paper, Hamilton and Flavin (hereafter HF) (1986) addressed this 
issue drawing evidence from the 1964-1980 period and reached a conclusion in support 
of the solvency of the U.S. government.  The objective of our exercise is to extend the HF 
methodology and examine the issue over a much longer time span that covers 
dynamically very different deficit episodes.   
In Section 2 we present the basic analytical framework and discuss some 
limitations of existing studies that have examined the issue of fiscal sustainability in the 
                                                 
1 The Ponzi scheme is a state where there are incentives for an economic agent to finance its excess 
expenses including interest payments on debt by issuing new debt. 
  2U.S. within the framework of the PVB constraint. In Section 3 we use a rational 
expectations formulation to accommodate non-stationary behaviors in the debt process 
and present a more flexible model to test the PVB constraint. In Section 4 we examine 
the salient features of the debt and fiscal balance series that span over 75 years. In 
Section 5 we test the PVB constraint using data over this long time span that has recorded 
very different dynamics of the debt process. We find that our model captures all the 
important turning points of the debt stock very well. Overall the results emerge in support 
of the solvency, perhaps super-solvency, of the U.S. federal government in the long run. 
 
2. THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK AND PREVIOUS STUDIES 
Following the work of HF we assume that the government issues only one kind of 
bond  , the aggregate debt, and its marginal cost is given by r, the real interest rate. t D
2  
We further assume that the government’s borrowing begins with a given initial condition 
at time t and ends in the period  1 tN + −  where N is an integer greater than one. Agents 
who lend to the government in each period believe that the government will run sufficient 
primary surpluses in the future, up to t+N , to offset its initial debt. The government’s 
budget identity is given by: 
t t t S D r D − + = −1 ) 1 (                                                                                           (1) 
                                                 
2  As pointed out by Bohn (2006) an assumption that sets the interest rate to a positive constant is required 
to convert the budget identity to a budget constraint. As in Hamilton and Flavin (1986) the most common in 
the literature is to assume that r is a constant. The next common alternative is   (See, for 
example, Hansen, Roberts and Sargent (1991) and Roberts (1991)). This underlies the assumption that real 
interest is serially uncorrelated. However, if the conditional expectation is a random variable because of the 
effect of changing information over time one could still set the real interest rate to a constant by taking 
iterated expectations.  
r r E t t = + ) ( 1
  3where    is the primary surplus,    is government revenue and  is non-
interest government expenditure. Writing equation (1) as  
t t t G T S − = t T t G
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Taking expectation conditional on the information available up to t, the limiting value of 
(3) can be written as 
*
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In (4), the current debt stock is equal to the expected present-value of the debt 
stock in the limit ( t A ) plus the discounted sum of the expected future primary surpluses 
( ). If the no-Ponzi-game (NPG) condition holds, i.e., 
*
t S t A is a non-positive constant, 
then the debt stock at time t must be matched by the present-value of expected future 
primary surpluses. If the NPG condition holds in strict equality,  0 t A = , the government 
is solvent. If t A  is a negative constant, then the government is in a state of super-solvency. 
In general, the PVB constraint holds when the limiting value of the expected discounted 
debt is non-positive.   





tt DA r S =+ + ,    ( ) 0 lim [ 1 ]
N
Nt N A Er D
−
→∞ =+ .                      (5) 
  4If  is treated as a constant, then the PVB constraint holds if  0 A 0 0 A ≤ . HF tested this 
condition in three ways. The first test resorts to examining the stationarity of   and   
in (5). HF argued that stationarity of both these series necessarily implies that  =0. 
They found that   and   were stationary over the period 1964-1980 and concluded that 
=0. Here they relied on the condition that stationarity of   implies stationarity of  . 
In the second and third tests HF assumed adaptive and partial-rational expectations 





t D t S
0 A t S
*
t S
t D (1 )
t r +   and current and lagged values of  . The 
estimated A
t S
0 coefficient turned out to be negative and insignificantly different from zero 
and confirmed their former conclusion.  
Although the HF procedure has led to many applications several questions arise in 
relation to the HF testing procedure. First, depending on the value of the real interest rate, 
the initial debt stock and the persistence of surpluses or deficits, the   series  may 
behave as a locally stationary or non-stationary series (see (1)) and may not be fully 
informative of fiscal sustainability. Second, when the discount factor is close to unity 
(0.9889 in the HF study), the   process becomes virtually a unit root process unless the 




 3  So the use of current and 
lagged values of stationary  process does not capture the dynamics of the   process. 




t D t D
t tends towards zero as t 
becomes large. However, this is not guaranteed if   is non-stationary.  t D
                                                 
3 Engle and West (2004) have also pointed this out in relation to exchange rate expectations. 
 
  5Wilcox (1989) offers a much simpler method for testing the PVB constraint. First 
he relaxes the assumption of fixed r and defines a variable  discount factor by 






i i t r q , 
4
0 1. q =  He multiplies (1) through by  and discounts the variables 
from period t back to period zero and iterates the outcome forward for N periods and 
takes expectation to arrive at: 
t q
tt DA S ′′ =+ t ′ N D ′ ,                                                              (6)  lim tN t t AE →∞ + ′ =
where ′ indicates the discounted values using the variable discount rate qt. Then Wilcox 
shifts the test of the NPG condition from  t A′ to  t D′ by showing that the path of  t A′ is 
determined by the path of : if  t D′ t D′  is  stationary,  t A′   is constant, and if   is  non-
stationary, then,   is non-constant. Therefore, a zero-mean stationary  series satisfies 
the PVB constraint. Using the HF sample, Wilcox computed 
t D′
t A′ t D′
t D′series and found it to be 
non-stationary with a positive unconditional mean and therefore, concluded that the U.S. 
federal fiscal policy was unsustainable.  
Wilcox’s procedure is attractively simple. Many studies have used the method to 
evaluate fiscal sustainability in various countries (see, for example, Corsetti and Roubini 
1991, Buiter and Patel 1992, Gerson and Nellor 1997, Uctum and Wickens 2000). 
However, Wilcox’s procedure raises several concerns. First, Wilcox’s method involves a 
backward formulation. A government standing at time t discounts its debt   to some 
initial year t=0 using an observed q
t D
t. In reality a government faced with a debt stock    t D
                                                 
S ⎤
⎦
4 If r is variable in (1), equation (4) becomes, 
  .                      () () 11
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  6at time t does not discount this back to a year in the distant past to assess whether the 
discounted   in the limit is zero or not. The government has to look into the future and 
formulate policies to deal with the debt stock  . It should be noted that although (6), 
rather the expression in footnote 3, is derived from the accounting identity (1), as a 
behavioral relationship it is qualitatively different from (1) especially when expectations 
are involved. An important question to ask is, is it meaningful to derive the expected 
present-value of future surpluses or the discounted values of future debts using variable 
discount rates which are unknown? Governments and economic agents are more likely to 
engage in a scenario analysis by computing several present-values of projected surpluses 
by using a range of discount rates that are set to decline over time in a systematic way.  
t D
t D
Second, Wilcox focused on  t A′ of (6) and argued that  t D′series should have a 
zero-mean in the limit for the present-value constraint to hold. This limit value of  t A′ 
approaching zero is true by construction. Since the discount factor has to approach zero 
in the limit,  should approach zero unless the debt series itself explodes without limit. 
But what is important to note is that the expected limit value in (6) is zero regardless of 
the I(0) or I(1) nature of the   series. For instance, consider the case where   is I(1) 
and hence  , where u
t A′
t D t D
t Da u Δ =+ t
i
t is a zero-mean I(0) process. Since   can be written as  t D
0 0
t
t i D Da t u
= =+ + ∑  the limiting expected value of  t D′ is 
() [] () 00 0 lim / 1 lim / 1 0
N NN
Nt N i Nt i E D aN u r E D aN r →∞ − →∞ =
⎡⎤ ++ + = + + = ⎣⎦ ∑  
where the initial value, D0, is assumed given and  .   0 r >
  7For fiscal sustainability what is important is how fast  t A′ approaches zero. For 
instance, a huge debt burden over 25 years may be sufficient to cripple a government 
even though the discounted debt becomes zero after 200 years. Another point to note is 
that the constructed discounted debt series   involves a scaling effect. The level of debt 
is likely to increase with the size of the budget that in turn increases with the size of the 
economy. Wilcox’s method may be better implemented if debt is taken as a ratio of GNP 
to remove the scaling effect.  
t D
Among other researchers on the topic, Trehan and Walsh (1988, 1991), Hakkio 
and Rush (1991) and Haug (1991) have tested the PVB constraint by testing cointegration 
between government revenue and expenditure inclusive of interest payments. Tanner and 
Liu (1994), Quintos (1995), Haug (1995), Ahmed and Rogers (1995), Martin (2000), 
Cipollini (2001) and Jha and Sharma (2004) have extended this procedure to allow for 
structural breaks. It should be noted however that cointegration between revenue and 
expenditure with a cointegrating vector (1, -1) is embedded in tests for the stationarity of 
the St series.  
Although we do not intend to provide a complete literature survey, it is worth 
mentioning some other approaches that were designed to assess fiscal sustainability. 
Kremers (1989) argued that if a fiscal policy yields a stock of debt in real terms that 
grows asymptotically at an average rate smaller than the interest rate, the policy operates 
within the PVB constraint. However, government borrowing would not be restricted by 
the PVB constraint if an economy is dynamically inefficient (see Abel et al. 1989). For 
McCallum (1984), fiscal sustainability does not contradict the government’s ability to run 
a permanent deficit inclusive of interest payments. A permanent primary deficit, however, 
  8violates the PVB constraint and hence is not sustainable in the long run.
5 In a political-
economic model, Velasco (2000) shows that due to the common property nature of 
government resources fiscal deficits emerge regardless of the intertemporal budget 
balance. Therefore, government debts tend to be excessively high in the long-run. Bohn 
(1998) suggested that fiscal policy is sustainable if the primary surplus positively 
responds to the changes in debt-income ratio as it provides direct evidence for corrective 
actions. Expanding further alone this line Bohn (2005) provides a criticism of the 
previous approaches and advocates estimating a policy reaction function. Based on this 
line of argument he concludes that the U.S. fiscal policy has historically been sustainable. 
Although this is an interesting alternative way of testing fiscal sustainability Bohn 
confounds the tax smoothing hypothesis and the sustainability hypothesis in his empirical 
model. Contrary to Bohn’s argument that economic growth could render sustainability 
despite negative expected surplus, Giannitsarou and Scott (2006) re-emphasize the 
importance of primary surpluses. Using another line of approach Auerbach (1997) and 
Auerbach et al. (2003) compute a required tax hike (or a spending cut) for fiscal 
sustainability and conclude that the current US fiscal policies are quite far from satisfying 
the intertemporal budget constraint. 
Some researchers have used regime-switching models to capture apparent non-
linearities in the discounted Dt series (Bajo-Rubio et al. 2004, Davig 2005). It is 
important to emphasize that structural breaks and non-linearities in a single series does 
not necessarily amount to a breakdown in a causal relationship (see Hoover, 2001 for an 
excellent exposition of this point). An advantage of focusing on the full equation in (5) is 
                                                 
5 McCallum (1984) considered the theoretical validity of the monetarist hypothesis that ‘a constant fiscal 
deficit can be maintained permanently if it is financed by the issue of bonds rather than money’. He showed 
that the monetarist claim is invalid if the deficit is defined exclusive of interest payments.  
  9that it may remain intact by structural breaks and regime switches. It also takes care of 
the scaling effect on the level of D that we mentioned earlier and may perform better over 
a longer time span since it can accommodate non-stationary series in a cointegrating 
framework. 
 
3. METHODOLOGY OF THE PRESENT STUDY 
We test whether the PVB constraint holds or not directly as in the HF model (5). 
However, the discussion in the previous section shows that we need a more flexible 
model structure to account for non-stationary movements of the debt series  . We have 
already noted that when the discount rate is close to unity the expected present value of 
primary surplus,  , may behave like a unit root process in observed samples. If   also 
shares similar behavior it is still possible for the PVB constraint to hold if  and 
cointegrate (locally) such that 
t D
*
t S t D
t D
*
t S 0 0 A ≤ .   
Since   is unobserved we adapt the rational expectations formulation developed 
by Hansen and Sargent (1980) to relate   to observed variables (see also Sargent 1978, 
Wallis 1980, and Campbell and Shiller 1987). For this we assume that the policy makers 
form expectations on the discounted sum of future surpluses using all the relevant 
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where  () r + = 1 1 ρ ,  tt Z aX ′ = , a is an (n×1) vector of constants and X is an (n×1) vector 
of relevant informational variables known both to the government and the public, and wt 
is an unsystematic informational variable only known to the government with the 
  10property  . The information set X 0 tt k Ew + = t may include both stationary and non-
stationary variables and we assume that Zt is stationary but it shares the same near unit-
root behavior that   is likely to possess in observed samples.  
*
t S
Assuming that  t Z has the following infinite-order moving average representation 
() tt Z Le ψ =   and using the Wiener-Kolmogorov prediction formula to get 
 (  and then using the autoregressive representation    ,
jk
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Since we are not interested in the non-linear parameter structure in this formulation we 
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By replacing  t Z  with   and redefining the parameters we write our model for 
testing the PVB constraint as 
t aX ′
( ) 01 2 1 1 1. . .
t
tt t r DA r X X X1 t p t β ββ −− − + ′′ ′ =+ ++ + + + ε                                          (10) 
where  t ε  is a well behaved disturbance term. Model (10) entails a couple of advantages 
over the previous formulations. First, it is grounded on a larger information set that policy 
makers and economic agents are likely to use at time t to make projections about future 
surpluses. Second, it may easily accommodate structural breaks or regime-shifts and non-




  114. TRENDS OF DEFICIT AND DEBT 
Following the comments by Eisner and Peiper (1984) and Eisner (1989) on the 
inappropriateness of gross debt and officially reported surplus as true measures of the 
fiscal position, we have made several adjustments to the officially reported data to obtain 
the net stock of public debt and the adjusted primary surpluses.  The adjustments made 
here, to some extent, are similar to those made by Hamilton and Flavin (1986). The 
adjustment method is illustrated in Table 1.  
===================== 




Figure 1 plots the both unadjusted and adjusted data series. It is worth reporting 
some observations from these data series. Figure 1b shows that though there is a level 
difference, the time paths of both gross and net debt are quite similar. Figure 1a shows 
that though the adjusted primary balance is often higher than the unadjusted one, they 
also follow the same pattern over time. Between 1929 and 1942 the net debt stock was 
quite small (negative in some periods). As a result of wartime (WWII) high deficits, the 
debt stock rose to a staggering 124 percent of GDP in 1945. The overlap of the primary 
and overall fiscal balance until mid 1940s show that interest payments on the existing 
debt was not excessive. After the war, deficits declined quickly and surpluses emerged. 
As a result, the debt stock remained roughly constant until the early 1970s and the debt 
ratio fell significantly from its wartime high to about 30 percent of GDP in the 1970s. 
However, from the mid 1970s, the federal fiscal policy operations show a dramatic 
change giving rise to fiscal deficits and increasing debt and debt ratios. This fiscal 
  12erosion is known as the effect of the high spending policy of the U.S. government.
6 
Although these large deficits are reckoned to be an outcome of the high spending policy, 
it is apparent from the overall balance as opposed to the primary balance in Figure 1 that 
the main cause of the high deficits was the increase in interest payments. This was a 
period of slow economic growth, high unemployment and higher oil prices with 
unavoidable high government spending and interest bills. Large deficits and the 
increasing debt stock during the 1970s and 1980s forced policy makers to contain the 
budgetary operations to avoid further deterioration. Corrective measures, such as 
expenditure cuts and large tax hikes that were implemented in the early 1990s turned 
primary fiscal balance to a large surplus and slowed down the growth rate of debt. But 
these large surpluses plunged again since 2001 primarily due to a massive tax cut 
program.  
  
5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
The minimal variable set that we use to predict the discounted present-value of 
expected primary surplus    and thereby the stock of debt is:  ) (
*
t S t X′  = 
( ), where U is the unemployment rate and the other variables are in 
the usual notations. The first four are in real terms.
, ,1 , , , tt t tt TGM F AUr t
                                                
7 If M1 is replaced by H, the first four 
variables defined as (T, G, ΔH, ΔFA) are the direct determinants of the adjusted primary 
 
6 Large deficits that occurred in the 1980s are often viewed as an outcome of increased spending. As Romer 
(2001, p. 550) noted, a desire to restrain the spending of future policy makers led the Reagan administration 
to follow high spending policies, and to incur large deficits. 
7 The annual data on interest bearing gross public debt, expenditure, interest payments on existing debt, 
base money stock, stocks of foreign liquid assets are obtained from the Federal Reserve Archival System 
for Economic Research (FRASER). Annual observations of GDP and implicit GDP deflator are from the 
National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA). Data on unemployment rate are from the U.S. Bureau of 
Labour Statistics.  
 
  13balance (Table 1). We use M1 in place of H and also the levels of M1 and FA instead of 
their differences because of their better predictive performance in the model. The real 
interest rate   is the nominal interest rate minus the actual inflation rate in year t. The 
nominal interest rate is the average rate (average over the interest rates paid on various 
debt instruments) that approximates the total interest payments on the stock of public 
debt. The inflation rate is computed from the implicit GDP price deflator.  
t r
  The ADF test for unit roots indicates that Ut and rt are stationary and the others 
are I(1). However, given the low power of the ADF test against near-unit-root 
alternatives, it is difficult to ascertain whether these series are non-stationary due to unit 
roots or some other reasons. Despite this difficulty a residual based ADF test from a static 
regression of (10) (with r set to 0.01 and the sample period 1929-2004) strongly supports 
the stationarity of the residuals.
8  A non-linear LS estimate of r from model (10) that 
includes a constant term provides an estimate of r=0.01 which is not very different from 
the average real interest rate observed over the sample period. We then estimated the 
model over a range of r from 1% to 4% and observed that the parameter estimates remain 
highly invariant to the choice of r. We, therefore, proceed to present our results based on 
the non-linear estimate of the r. 
Our primary focus is on the dynamic specification in (10). Figure 2 plots the 
actual and predicted values from (10) by setting p=2. The predicted values pick up the 
major turning points of the debt series remarkably well. We observe that by increasing p 
the model-fit could be improved and the residual autocorrelation could be reduced. To 
                                                 
8  A test procedure for cointegration that allows for different types of non-stationarity of the variables is yet 
to be developed. P.C.B. Phillips is currently looking into this subject matter (personal communications). 
  14conserve degrees of freedom, however, we add the lagged dependent variable to the 
information set X. 
 
======================= 
Insert Figure 2, Table 2 here 
======================= 
  Table 2 presents the results of two regressions, Model 1 with a constant term in 
(10) and Model 2 without. Both models fit the data very well as indicated by the 
diagnostic statistics reported at the bottom of Table 2. In Model 1 both the constant term 
and  estimates are statistically insignificant. (To re-iterate, the PVB constraint requires 
the constant term to be zero and 
0 A
0 0 ≤ A .) Figure 3a and 3b plot the recursive estimates of 
the constant term and . The constant term, though statistically insignificant, has 
remained mostly positive.  , on the other hand, has remained negative and statistically 
significant except towards the end of the sample period. The two estimates show a 
mirror-image behavior. Dropping the constant term leads to statistically significant 
negative estimates of   as seen in Figure 3c. These estimates are also highly stable. The 
AIC also favors Model 2. Figure 3d shows the actual and fitted values from Model 2. The 





                ============== 
Insert Figure 3 
============== 
  15The discussion in the previous paragraph shows that   is  statically  different 
from zero and takes a very stable negative value. We observe that the negativeness of    
is robust to variations in the information set (e.g., replacing T with GDP and real interest 
rate with the nominal rate and inflation rate) though it may become statistically 
insignificant some times. This renders strong support for the PVB constraint hypothesis 
and the solvency, perhaps super-solvency, of the U.S. federal government. Hamilton and 
Falvin (1986) arrived at this conclusion from a period when the debt stock was stationary. 
Our results show that the apparent non-stationarity of the debt stock, observed during the 
last few decades, does not necessarily lead to the rejection of the solvency hypothesis.  
0 A
0 A
It is worth examining how the variables in the information set bring about the 
above result. The high autoregressive coefficients of the lagged Dt terms indicates high 
persistence of the debt stock. Unlike private debt, it is not unusual for public debt to show 
such persistence. Given this persistence it would be informative to examine the time 
profile of the impulse response effects of the predictor variables on the debt stock.  Figure 
4 plots these impulse response effects over 50 years.  
As expected, a dollar increase in taxes and government expenditure exerts their 
opposite effects on the debt stock, each effect steadily decreasing towards zero. The 
effects do not necessarily seem to be symmetric. Wald test on the restriction that the sum 
of tax coefficients in Model 2 is unity does not lead to a rejection of the restriction 
whereas the same test on the expenditure components leads to a rejection. It appears that 
debt created by an increase in government expenditure cannot be fully offset by an equal 
increase in taxes, after controlling for the interest effect. 
  16Unlike T and G the expected effect of M1 and FA on D is ambiguous. However, 
since  ΔM1 and ΔFA are expected to have a positive effect on the adjusted primary 
balance and a negative effect on net debt, purely from a technical point of view, the initial 
effect of M1 and FA is expected to be negative. This is evident in Figure 4. Subsequently, 
however, a dollar increase in M1 or FA tend to increase the debt stock though these 
effects taper off much faster than the T and G effects. A government could finance a 
certain amount of expenditure by seignorage, therefore, the immediate effect of M1 on 
debt is negative. But a higher M1, which in turn increases the amount of financial assets 
of the economy, may increase the demand for government bonds leading to an increase in 
the government debt subsequently. On the other hand, for a government, the costs of 
financing deficit by drawing down FA may be higher than the interest cost of new debts. 
A government that runs down FA continually is vulnerable for criticisms purely on 
political grounds. Therefore, a government may not rely on financing deficit by running 
down FA frequently. In fact if the gains from holding FA are higher than the interest cost 
of debt, governments would tend to borrow more as FA increases.  
We used the unemployment rate, as in many other studies (Barro 1979, Roubini 
and Sachs 1986) to capture the business cycle effects on the primary surplus and debt. 
We find U to be a better predictor of debt than the GDP growth rate. Higher 
unemployment rate is expected to increase the deficit and debt. This effect is reflected in 
Figure 4e. The last variable in the list is the real interest rate. Apart from the impact 
channeled through real money stock, the real interest rate has a significant impact on the 
fiscal balance in many ways. A high real rate results in increased interest payments on 
existing debt leading to large fiscal deficits and to further borrowings. As new 
  17government borrowings crowd out the private economy, this will lead to lower tax 
revenue and increased primary deficit adding further pressure on debt. This effect is born 
out in Figure 4f.  
 
6. CONCLUSION  
In this paper we consider whether U.S. fiscal operations satisfy the PVB 
constraint using annual data over a longer time horizon stretching from 1929 to 2004. We 
argue that tests based on the full intertemporal budget equation are more desirable than 
tests based on debt or surplus series alone. By allowing for rational expectations on future 
surpluses we extend the Hamilton-Flavin model to accommodate non-stationary 
movements of the debt stock. This formulation leads us to replace the present value of 
expected future surpluses with a set of observed variables. This is a flexible framework 
that can accommodate both stationary and non-stationary variables and take care of any 
structural breaks and scaling effects present in the debt series.  
 Based on the current and lagged values of taxes, government expenditure, M1, 
government foreign financial assets, the unemployment rate, and the real interest rate as 
predictors of future surpluses, we find that our model predicts the net debt stock 
extremely well over very different fiscal episodes. The model provides highly stable 
recursive estimates on the main coefficient    that tests the validity of the PVB 
constraint. The conclusion that emerges from the exercise is that U.S. federal budgetary 
policy does not violate the PVB constraint and the U.S. government is solvent, or super-
solvent, in the long-run, despite the presence of an upward trend in the debt stock series 
since the 1980s.  
0 A
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Table 1 
Computation of Net Debt and Adjusted Primary Balance-2004 
                                     U.S. Dollar 
          Series                             Billions 
          Net Debt          
Interest Bearing Gross Federal Debt                               7354.7   
(-)   Currency plus Deposits at Fed (High-Powered Money H)                  -  744.0 
(-)   Stock of Gold, SDR, Reserve Position at IMF  
       and Convertible Foreign Currencies (FA)                -    83.5 
(=)  Net Stock of Debt (at Current Prices)                               6527.2 
( ) by Implicit GDP Price Deflator                                                      ÷ ÷ 1.082 
(=)  Real Net Stock of Debt (at 2000 Prices)                                    6031.4 
   
         Adjusted Primary Balance 
             Government Revenue                          1880.1 
(-)   Non-Interest Government Expenditure                         - 2132.0  
(=)  Primary Balance                         -251.9 
(+)  Seignorage (Change in H)                              +    37.3 
(+)  Change in FA                      +    -2.5 
(=)  Adjusted Primary Balance (at Current Prices)                  -217.1 
( ) by  Implicit GDP Price Deflator                    ÷ ÷ 1.082 
(=)  Real Adjusted Primary Balance (at 2000 Prices)                              -200.6 
 
Note: The sum of H and FA (foreign liquid assets) is used as a proxy for the financial assets of 
the government.  






















  23Table 2 
OLS Regression of Equation (10) (Dep. Var.: Net Debt)
 
Explanatory                  Model 1                                               Model 2                      
Variable  Est. Coef.    Sum
a       F prob
b             Est. Coef.      Sum
a      F prob
b  
Constant  -262.74                        0.556       ---              ---            --- 
(1+r)
t             -371.99                        0.461             -646.63                        0.001     
Tt      -0.871                            -0.832      
Tt-1         0.000       -0.934       0.000    -0.031       -0.867       0.000 
Tt-2        -0.063                    -0.004            
Gt       1.319                        1.329                 
Gt-1          0.123        1.334       0.000     0.120        1.356       0.000 
Gt-2        -0.108                    -0.093                 
M1t       0.277                       0.369                   
M1t-1         -1.125        0.633       0.003    -1.238        0.724       0.000 
M1t-2       1.481                        1.593                 
FAt      -2.516                    -2.604                
FAt-1       3.363        1.231       0.000     3.521        1.109       0.000  
FAt-2       0.384                      0.192                 
Ut      -5.521                              -6.431                
Ut-1       6.225      16.019       0.005     6.269      16.476       0.000    
Ut-2     15.315                                16.638           
rt     17.177                          17.609          
rt-1         3.877      26.529       0.000     4.617      27.438       0.000 
rt-2           5.475                   5.212           
Dt-1       0.699                       0.689                 
Dt-2       0.215        0.914       0.000         0.213        0.902       0.000  
   
Sigma      57.646                   57.285 
R
2       0.999            ---         
AIC       8.352          8.332         
AR F       1.800  (0.176)
c       2.225  (0.119)                    
ARCH F             0.069  (0.793)        0.029  (0.863)         
Hetero F     0.763  (0.735)        1.016  (0.532)        
Normality Chi
2    0.703  (0.703)        0.796  (0.672)          
RESET F     4.131  (0.047)        4.263  (0.044) 
Notes: (a) the sum of contemporaneous and lagged coefficients; (b) p-values for the F test 
on each variable; (c) values in parenthesis are p-values of diagnostic tests. Sample period 
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                 Figure 1: Federal government fiscal balance and debt stock (US$ billions) 
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3a. Constant: Model 1




3b. A0: Model 1
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      Figure 3: Recursive estimates (with confidence intervals) and actual and fitted net debt 
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Figure 4. Impulse response effects of each variable on the debt stock 
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